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Abstract. S-Boxes are important security components of block ciphers.
We provide theoretical results on necessary or sufficient criteria for an
(invertible) 4-bit S-Box to be weakly APN. Thanks to a classification
of 4-bit invertible S-Boxes achieved independently by De Cannie´re and
Leander-Poschmann, we can strengthen our results with a computer-
aided proof. We also propose a class of 4-bit S-Boxes which are very
strong from a security point of view.
1 Introduction
We consider block ciphers acting on a vector space (F2)
n. It is important to
identify conditions on the components of the cipher that may ensure its security.
There are many competing notions of security, hence several kinds of security
criteria, and some of them focus on the role of the S-Boxes. For a large class
of nowadays block ciphers, the S-Boxes are bijective vectorial Boolean functions
f : (F2)
m → (F2)
m, hence they are functions from the finite field (F2)
m to itself.
In this paper we focus on 4-bit S-Boxes, as used for example in SERPENT
([2]) and PRESENT ([4]), although we present also a theorem for the general
case. Several security criteria are affine-invariant and this justifies the work done
to achieve the classification of 4-bit S-Boxes in affine-equivalence classes, as done
for example by De Cannie´re ([8]) and Leander and Poschmann ([9]) (these clas-
sifications have been achieved independently).
There is a new security criteria for S-Boxes which is affine-invariant, the
weakly differential uniformity. Particularly interesting is the concept of weakly
APN. We determine several conditions (some computational and some theoreti-
cal), which are either sufficient or necessary for a 4-bit vectorial Boolean function
to be weakly APN.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section. 2, we introduce and moti-
vate the notion of weakly APN function, highlighting the case of dimension 4.
In Section. 3 we present our theoretical results, including a theorem for any di-
mension. In Section. 4 we discuss our computational results. Finally, in Section.
5 we provide further computations that may be interesting and we draw our
conclusions.
22 Preliminaries on weakly APN functions
Without loss of generality, in the sequel we consider only Boolean functions
f : (F2)
m → (F2)
m such that f(0) = 0. We also write fˆu(x) := f(x + u) + f(x)
(the derivative of f) and Im(f) = {f(x) | x ∈ (F2)
m} (the image of f).
A notion of non-linearity for S-Boxes that has received a lot of attention is
the following.
Definition 1. The function f is δ-differentially uniform if for any u ∈ (F2)
m \
{0} and for any v ∈ (F2)
m, |{x ∈ (F2)
m : fˆu(x) = v}| ≤ δ .
If f is 2-differentially uniform, then it is called an Almost Perfectly Nonlinear
(APN) function.
The property of being δ-differentially uniform is an affine-invariant. W.r.t. diff-
entially uniformity, the best S-Boxes are the APN S-Boxes. APN functions are
indeed a very hot research topic (see for instance the recent contributions [3]
and [5]). Unfortunately, for some even dimensions, no APN permutation exists.
This is the case for dimension m = 4, which has cryptographic significance at
least for SERPENT and PRESENT. In this case, the best we can have is δ = 4.
There is a natural generalization of differential uniformity presented recently
in [7], which we recall in the following definition.
Definition 2. The function f is weakly δ-differentially uniform if for any u ∈
(F2)
m \ {0} we have |Im(fˆu)| > 2
m−1/δ.
If f is weakly 2-differentially uniform, then it is called a weakly Almost
Perfectly Nonlinear (weakly APN) function.
By [7], §4, Fact 3, a δ-differentially uniform map is weakly δ-differentially uni-
form, and is easy to check that weak δ-differential uniformity is affine-invariant.
The significance for the previous definition lies in [7], Theorem 4.4. To ap-
preciate it we need another definition.
Definition 3. A function f is strongly l-anti-invariant if for any two subspaces
V,W ≤ (F2)
m such that f(V ) = W then either dim(V ) = dim(W ) < m − l or
V = W = (F2)
m.
An iterated block cipher is obtained by the composition of several rounds
(or round functions), i.e., key-dependent permutations of the message/cipher
space. To avoid potential weaknesses of a given cipher C, it is desirable that
the permutation group Γ∞(C) generated by its round functions with the key
varying in the key space is primitive (for instance, a way to construct a trap-
door using imprimitivity is presented in [11]). Translation-based ciphers (see [7],
Def. 3.1) form an interesting class of iterated block ciphers containing AES[10],
SERPENT, PRESENT. According to Theorem. 4.4 in [7], if C is a translation-
based cipher and each brick γ′ of every parallel S-Box γ used in the proper
round under consideration is both weakly 2r-differentially uniform and strongly
r-anti-invariant for some r with 1 ≤ r ≤ m/2, then Γ∞(C) is primitive. It may
seem that Theorem 4.4 in [7] requires too strong conditions in order to ensure
3primitivity, but indeed they turn out to be quite natural, as shown in [7], §5. In
the case of 4-bit S-Boxes, we have only two possibilities: r = 1, requiring every
γ′ to be both strongly 1-anti-invariant (which always holds if it is maximally
non-linear, see for instance [7], footnote 4 on p. 347) and weakly APN; or r = 2,
requiring every γ′ to be both weakly 4-differentially uniform (which always holds
if it is 4-differentially uniform) and 2-strongly-anti-invariant.
3 Theoretical results on weakly APN functions
Our first result is to show that for 4-differentially uniform functions the case
r = 2 of Theorem 4.4 in [7] is just a sub-case of the case r = 1.
Proposition 1 Let f : (F2)
4 → (F2)
4 be a Boolean function such that
(i) f is 4-differentially uniform
(ii) f is strongly 2-anti-invariant.
Then f is weakly APN.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that |Im(fˆu)| ≤ 4. Then from (i) we deduce that
|fˆ−1u (y)| = 4 for every y ∈ Im(fˆu). Hence we have fˆ
−1
u (f(u)) = {0, u, x, u + x}
for some x, in particular fˆ−1u (f(u)) is a 2-dimensional vector subspace. On the
other hand, fˆu(x) = fˆu(u) implies f(x + u) = f(u) − f(x). It follows that
f({0, u, x, u+ x}) is a 2-dimensional vector subspace, contradicting (ii).
⊓⊔
In other words, Proposition 1 provides some sufficient conditions for a 4-bit
S-Box to be weakly APN. Other sufficient conditions are presented in the next
proposition and are based on the following non-linearity measures:
ni(f) = |{v ∈ (F2)
m \ {0} : deg(< f, v >) = i}| (1)
and
nˆ(f) = max
u∈(F2)m\{0}
|{v ∈ (F2)
m \ {0} : deg(< fˆu, v >) = 0}| . (2)
Proposition 2 Let f : (F2)
4 → (F2)
4 be a Boolean function such that nˆ(f) = 0.
Then f is weakly APN.
Proof. Let (F2)
4 = {x1, . . . , x16} and given u ∈ (F2)
m \ {0} let M = (mij) ∈
(F2)
4×16 with mij := (fˆu)i(xj). By definition, f is weakly APN if and only if
|Im(fˆu)| > 4, hence if and only if M has more than 4 distinct columns.
Assume by contradiction that M has n ≤ 4 distinct columns and let M ′ ∈
(F2)
4×n be the corresponding submatrix.
If M ′ has rank 4, then we may write (1, 1, 1, 1) as a linear combination of the
rows of M ′:
(1, 1, 1, 1) = aM ′1 + bM
′
2 + cM
′
3 + dM
′
4.
Since all the other columns of M are equal to the columns of M ′, we may write
(1, . . . , 1) ∈ (F2)
16 as the same linear combination of the rows of M :
(1, . . . , 1) = aM1 + bM2 + cM3 + dM4.
4Hence the function < fˆu, (a, b, c, d) > is the constant 1, contradiction.
If instead M ′ has rank ≤ 3, then we may write (0, 0, 0, 0) as a nonzero linear
combination of the rows of M ′:
(0, 0, 0, 0) = aM ′1 + bM
′
2 + cM
′
3 + dM
′
4.
Since all the other columns of M are equal to the columns of M ′, we may write
(0, . . . , 0) ∈ (F2)
16 as the same linear combination of the rows of M :
(0, . . . , 0) = aM1 + bM2 + cM3 + dM4.
Hence the function < fˆu, (a, b, c, d) > is the constant 0, contradiction.
⊓⊔
The following partial converse to Proposition 2 gives necessary conditions
and holds for any m ≥ 2.
Theorem 1. Let f : (F2)
m → (F2)
m be a (weakly) APN function.
Then nˆ(f) ≤ 1.
Proof. Let f = (f1, f2, . . . , fm) with fi : (F2)
m → F2 and assume by contradic-
tion that both < fˆu, v1 > and < fˆu, v2 > are constant for some u, v1 6= v2 ∈
(F2)
m \ {0}. Up to a linear transformation sending v1 to (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) and v2 to
(0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), without loss of generality we may assume that both (fˆu)1 = ˆ(f1)u
and (fˆu)2 = ˆ(f2)u are constant. It follows that |Im(fˆu)| ≤ 2
m−2 and f is not
weakly APN, contradiction.
⊓⊔
As an application of Theorem 1, we obtain the following:
Proposition 3 Let f : (F2)
4 → (F2)
4 be a weakly APN permutation.
Then deg(f) = 3 and n3(f) ∈ {12, 14, 15}.
Proof. It is well-known that deg f ≤ 3 (see for instance [15]). If
|{v ∈ (F2)
4 \ {0} : deg(< f, v >) ≤ 2}| ≤ 5
then our claim holds, since {v ∈ (F2)
4 \{0} : deg(< f, v >) ≤ 2}∪{0} is a vector
subspace of (F2)
4.
Let f = (f1, f2, f3, f4) with fi : (F2)
4 → F2 and assume by contradiction that
deg(S) ≤ 2 for 6 different linear combinations S =
∑4
i=1 vifi. From the basic
theory of quadratic Boolean functions (see for instance [6], §2.2), it follows that
the derivative Sˆu is constant for every u ∈ V (S) ⊆ (F2)
4, where V (S) is a vector
subspace of dimension 0 if and only if S is bent, 4 if and only if S is linear (affine),
and 2 otherwise. Now, S is not bent since it is balanced (see for instance [1]) and
bent functions are never balanced (see for instance [12]). Thus dimV (S) ≥ 2
for every S and |V (S) \ {0}| ≥ 3, in particular 6 sets V (S) \ {0} ⊆ (F2)
4 \ {0}
cannot be disjoint. Hence there is u ∈ (F2)
4 \ {0} and two different non-zero
linear combinations S1 and S2 such that both ˆ(S1)u and
ˆ(S2)u are constant and
this contradicts Theorem 1.
⊓⊔
54 Computational results on weakly APN function
The problem of classifying (invertible) S-Boxes f : (F2)
m → (F2)
m (w.r.t. affine-
equivalence) was solved in [8,9] in the case m = 4 and has been recently checked
in [13,14]. By a direct check on the class representatives, we may draw a series
of consequences, that we call Facts.
First of all, we see that three of our theoretical results cannot be inverted,
as follows.
Fact 1 The converse of Proposition 1 does not hold.
Proof. (0, 1, 2, 13, 4, 15, 14, 7, 8, 3, 5, 9, 10, 6, 12, 11) is weakly APN but is not 4-
differentially uniform. ⊓⊔
Fact 2 The converse of Proposition 2 does not hold.
Proof. (0, 1, 2, 13, 4, 15, 14, 7, 8, 3, 5, 9, 10, 6, 12, 11) is weakly APN but nˆ = 1. ⊓⊔
Fact 3 The converse of Theorem 1 does not hold.
Proof. For f = (0, 1, 2, 7, 4, 10, 15, 9, 8, 3, 13, 14, 12, 5, 6, 11) we have nˆ(f) = 1 but
f is not weakly APN. ⊓⊔
Next, we can strengthen Proposition 3:
Fact 4 Let f : (F2)
4 → (F2)
4 be a weakly APN permutation. Then deg(f) = 3
and n3(f) ∈ {14, 15}.
Unfortunately, the previous fact cannot be inverted:
Fact 5 The converse of Fact 4 does not hold.
Proof. For f = (0, 1, 2, 7, 4, 10, 15, 9, 8, 3, 13, 14, 12, 5, 6, 11) we have deg(f) = 3
and n3(f) = 14, but f is not weakly APN. ⊓⊔
Finally, we want to provide some sufficient conditions (for f to be weakly
APN), involving also the following classical concept of non-linearity:
Definition 4.
Lin(f) = max
a∈(F2)m, b∈(F2)m\{0}
| < f, b >W (a)| ,
where W denotes the Walsh coefficient (see for instance (1) in [9]).
Since for m = 4 we have that the best f ’s have Lin(f) = 8, we find of interest
our following result:
Fact 6 Let f : (F2)
4 → (F2)
4 be a Boolean permutation such that
Lin(f) = 8, f is 4− differentially uniform, n3(f) ≥ 14 .
Then f is weakly APN.
Regrettably, the assumptions of Fact 6 cannot be weakened. We provide two
(affine-independent) counterexamples:
– with f = (0, 1, 2, 12, 4, 13, 11, 10, 8, 15, 5, 9, 6, 14, 7, 3) we have Lin(f) = 8 and
n3(f) = 14, but f is not weakly APN,
– with f = (0, 1, 2, 12, 4, 6, 14, 5, 8, 3, 13, 10, 9, 7, 15, 11) we have that f is
4-differentially uniform and that n3(f) = 14, but again f is not weakly APN.
65 More computational results and conclusions
Let we recall from [9] the further measures of non-linearity:
- Lin1(f) = max a,b∈(F2)m
w(a)=w(b)=1
{|< f, b >W (a)}| ,
- Diff1(f) = max a,b∈(F2)m
w(a)=w(b)=1
{|fˆ−1a (b)|} .
Then we introduce a new class of S-Boxes suitable for block ciphers construction:
Definition 1 We say that a Boolean permutation f : (F2)
4 → (F2)
4 is a strong
S-Box if f is weakly APN, 4-differentially uniform, and
Lin(f) = 8, Diff1(f) = 0 Lin1(f) = 4, n3(f) ≥ 14 .
Morever, we say that f is very strong if it is strong and strongly 2-anti-invariant.
Note that a very strong function is in particular both optimal ([9], Def. 1) and
Serpent-type ([9], Def. 2), and also it satisfies Theorem. 4.4 of [7]. A direct
computation (see [13]) allows us to conclude:
Fact 7 There are 55296 strong S-Boxes and 2304 very strong ones.
Remark 1. As in the rest of the paper, all statements in this section assume
f(0) = 0. So Fact 7 implies that there are actually 55296∗16 = 884736 invertible
4-bit S-Boxes equivalent via a translation to strong S-Boxes, therefore sharing
their security robustness. The same goes for 2304∗16 = 36864 S-Boxes equivalent
to very strong S-Boxes.
Following [9], we have tested the properties of the S-Boxes used in SERPENT,
denoted by S0, S1, . . . , S7 (for details see [13]), and we get:
Fact 8 The S-Boxes S3, S4, S5, S7 are strong. None of the Si’s is very strong.
In conclusion, we have considered the link between the recent notion of weakly
APN function and several more traditional non-linearity properties, such as dif-
ferential uniformity, algebraic degree and classical non-linearity. We obtained
both theoretical and computational results. In particular, sufficient conditions
for an S-Box to be weakly APN are presented in Propositions 1 and 2 and Fact
6; while necessary ones can be found in Theorem 1, Proposition 3 and Fact 4.
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